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Abstract
We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impos-
sibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is
in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This
new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve
the party, which owes specic performance of its obligation without imposing
any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a
court's decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should
be based on three tests. First, between contract formation and performance
a low-probability-event occurs. Second, this event causes an excessive increase
in the costs of specic performance. Third, the concept of an excessive in-
crease should take into due consideration the other party's interest in specic
performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the rst two tests, but not
the third test. We also show under what conditions an excessive performance
diculty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an ad-
justment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility,
if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a
rule under which the law insists on specic performance or damage payments.
We also argue that a specic rule of economic impossibility leads to better and
more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alterna-
tive, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecic cover of
the \good faith" or the \Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus" doctrine.Introduction
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
Two cases illustrate the problem. (1) A shipping company agrees to ship a water 
pumps from Istanbul to Mumbai for a fixed charge. A war in the Middle East leads to 
the  closing  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Freight  costs  from  Istanbul  to  Mumbai  rise  to  an 
unexpectedly  high  level  as  the  ship  must  take  the  route  around  Africa.  (2)  A 
businessperson  in  Istanbul  wants  to  run  one  of  his  restaurants  as  a  “nostalgic 
restaurant”. For this purpose, he buys furniture of a particular brand, by choosing 
from the sales catalogue of an antiques shop for the price of 20,000 TL. At the time 
of the contract in his storage the buyer had more than one sample of each selected 
furniture, which were produced around the year 1900 by a then well known French 
furniture corporation. However before the seller sorts the goods to be delivered, a fire 
destroys all samples of half of the furniture. The buyer insists on performance and 
argues that he has bought furniture of a particular brand and that all the missing 
items are still available on secondary markets and auctions around the world. The 
seller argues correctly that even though this is true, he would have to incur costs 
(prices  on  the  secondary  market,  transportation  costs,  customs  duties,  and 
transactions costs) of 400,000 TL to collect and deliver the missing items. Therefore, 
he denies performance. 
 
In an early article on the problem, Pietro Trimarchi
1 wrote, “Most of the papers which 
discuss  this  subject  from  an  economic  point  of  view  deal  with  the  issue  of 
"impossibility"  in  the  broadest  terms,  placing  "commercial  impossibility"  (or 
"impracticability"), "physical impossibility" and "frustration of purpose" side by side”. 
 
When  we  approach  these  cases  from  an  economics  perspective,  we  make  three 
important observations. First, both contracts, which ex-ante that is at the time of their 
formation, led to an expected gain of both parties, a “win-win” constellation result in a 
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loss of one party, if the legal order preserves the profit of the other party by insisting 
on specific performance at the stipulated price. Ex-post therefore performance would 
lead to a “win-loose” constellation.  
Second, even if the idea of a “nostalgia restaurant” might be a great business idea, 
the additional costs of the specific performance, caused by the fire, would -beyond 
reasonable doubt- be much higher than the profits for the restaurant owner. Not only 
would one party loose by the specific performance, but her losses would outweigh 
the benefits of the other party, especially if one considers that the planned restaurant 
can also be run with a different brand of antique furniture. The whole rationale of a 
contract as an instrument to generate gains would break down.  
 
Finally, the third and crucial economic observation is that in this particular case it is 
obvious for a third party like a judge to see this change. We shall argue that the latter 




However, the second and third observations do not hold for the first case, which has 
therefore a structure different from the second case. We shall argue that in this case 
courts should not terminate the contract but adjust the price, but give the other party 
the right to opt out of the contract.      
 
Many legal orders provide a rule of economic impossibility or economic impractica-
bility (see, for example, US Contract Law).
3 This rule allows the party, which owes 
specific performance to terminate the contract without paying damage compensation. 
Similarly, in Germany courts have developed the concept of economic impossibility 
(wirtschaftliche Unmöglichkeit), which allowed denying specific performance. In the 
course of a major reform, this rule was explicitly incorporated into the Civil Code in 
2002 (Section 275, 2 BGB). What is the rationale for this? Why does the law allow 
denying  performance  and  consequently  violating  the  principle  of  “Pacta  Sunt 
                                                 
2 This consequence requires that the cause for an excessive increase of the performance costs was 
not negligently set by the party, which owes the specific performance.  
3 M. A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 Journal of Legal Analysis, 207, 
209-210  (2009);  D.J.  Smythe,  Bounded  Rationality,  the  Doctrine  of  Impracticability,  and  the 
Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 227 (2003-
2004); A. Skyes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second Best World, 19 Journal of 
Legal Studies, 43 (1990). 
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Servanda” even though performance is possible, albeit at a very high cost? We tackle 
this problem from an economic point of view, starting with some illustrative cases 
from Turkish Law and introducing the Turkish doctrine of economic impossibility. We 
proceed by the literature review on the issue and briefly explain the two groups of 
approaches in the legal doctrine to the cases of impossibility. In addition, we show 
why specific performance should not take place if circumstances arise after contract 
formation that threaten to annihilate or even reverse the surplus from the contract. 
Moreover, we show that under ideal conditions both the rule of expectation damages 
for  breach  of  contract  and  the  rule  of  specific  performance  give  incentives  to 
terminate the contract if the total surplus from it becomes negative between contract 
formation and performance. We show that these two rules provide a mechanism for 
the parties to breach a contract if and only if after contract formation rising costs of 
performance make the joint surplus from the contract negative. We then show that in 
exceptional cases of economic impossibility parties can save costs if the party, which 
owes  specific  performance,  is  allowed  to  deny  performance  without  incurring  any 
legal consequences such as paying damage compensation.   
 
I. Economic Impossibility in Turkish Law 
 
A. Some Illustrative Cases from Turkish Law  
 
1. Case 1: Long term rent agreement 
 
The  plaintiff  rented  the  defendant’s  real  estate  for  10  years  at  a  monthly  rent  of 
$ 5500. However, after the economic crisis in 2001, the plaintiff argued that due to a 
75%  shift  in  the  exchange  rate,  the  balance  of  benefits  between  the  parties  has 
changed  in  such  a  way  that  performance  of  the  contract  is  intolerable  for  him. 
Accordingly, he demanded that either the exchange rate be fixed for the purpose of 
the contract at 679.692 TL or that the rent be adjusted to 3038 dollars.
4  
 
                                                 
4 See Yarg. 11. HD, 13.12.2001 T., E.2001/11526 K.2001/11752. 
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2. Case 2:  Mortgage credit 
 
In 2000, when the Deutschmark was worth 320000 TL, the plaintiff took a foreign 
exchange housing loan of 35000 DM from the defendant, which was to be repaid in 
36 monthly installments. However, due to the economic crisis and devaluation, the 
DM appreciated to 500000 TL and the plaintiff argued that as a retired civil servant, it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  perform  the  contract  and  he  demanded  that,  for  the 
purpose of the contract, the exchange rate be fixed at 320000 TL.
5 
 
3. Case 3: Retirement income contract 
 
In 1981, the plaintiff signed a retirement income contract with the defendant bank and 
paid a total of DM 12.600 over the course of 7 years. Accordingly, starting in 1988, 
the defendant paid a monthly income of 270.000 TL to the defendant. However, in 
1999, the plaintiff argued that due to the high amount of inflation in the country, the 




B. Economic Impossibility in Turkish Legal Doctrine 
 
The  current  Turkish  Code  of  Obligations,  lacks  any  specific  rule  applicable  to  all 
cases of economic impossibility. However, in the doctrine the prevailing opinion is 
that  economic  impossibility,  which  is  an  excessive  increase  in  the  cost  of 
performance, is not technically an impossibility that can cancel the parties’ obligations 
from the contract.
7 Accordingly, as accepted both in the doctrine and by the Turkish 
Court  of  Cassation  (Yargıtay),  in  case  of  an  excessive  performance  difficulty,  the 
                                                 
5 See Yarg. 13. HD, 9.06.2005 T., E.2005/1874 K.2005/9749. 
6 See Yarg. 11. HD, 25.1.2002 T., E. 2001/7365 K.2002/477. 
7 In  this vein, see F.  Eren, Borçlar Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 9
th  Edition,  Đstanbul 2008, p. 997; Đ. 
Kaplan, Hakimin Sözle meye Müdahalesi, 2
nd Edition, Ankara 2007, p. 139; K. Tunçomağ, 32 Đstanbul 
Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 887 (1967); K. T. Gürsoy, Hususi Hukukda Clausula Rebus Sic 
Sitantibus (Emprevizyon Nazariyesi), 1
st Edition, Ankara 1950, p. 27; E. Erzurumluoğlu, Türk-Đsviçre 
Borçlar  Hukuku  Sistemine  Göre  Borçluya  Yüklenemeyen  Nedenlerden  Dolayı  Edimin  Yerine 
Getirilememesi, 1
st Edition, Ankara 1970, p. 60. According to Serozan, the line between the concepts 
of  “subjective  impossibility”  and  “excessive  performance  difficulty”  is  quite  indistinct.  However,  the 
author argues that it would be more appropriate not to handle cases of economic impossibility with the 
technical institution of impossibility because solutions brought to excessive performance difficulty are 
much more flexible than the mechanical solutions brought to the cases of impossibility. R. Serozan, 
Borçlar Hukuku Genel Bölüm, 4th Edition, Đstanbul 2006, p. 168. 
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principle of good faith should be taken into consideration.  Furthermore, since the 
basis of the contract has collapsed, either the parties’ contractual obligations should 
be adapted to the new conditions or the contract should be terminated, so that the 
debtor can be partially or completely be relieved of his obligations.
8 
 
According to Erzurumluoğlu, accepting excessive performance difficulty as a type of 
impossibility constitutes a contradiction in terms because, by definition, the concept 
of impossibility refers to a certainty.
9 Therefore, if excessive performance difficulty is 
accepted  as  impossibility,  this  means  that  what  is  logically  possible  is  deemed 
impossible.
10  Similarly,  Tunçomağ  argues  that  the  concept  of  “excessive 
performance  difficulty”  is  a  very  clear  term  and  clearly  distinct  from  the  term 
“impossibility”. As a matter of fact, in case of impossibility, overcoming the obstacle to 
perform is not humanly possible, whereas in case of excessive performance difficulty, 
such an obstacle can be overcome, albeit at unreasonable costs.
11   
 
Another important reason why economic impossibility is not accepted as impossibility 
in Turkey in its technical meaning rests in its results. German courts as a solution to 
cases  in  which  the  character of performance  has  changed  completely  due  to  the 
increase in cost and price created the concept of “economic impossibility”. However, 
the legal result of this acceptance was that such contracts could not be sustained 
since  in  cases  of  impossibility  the  contractual  obligation  would  directly  end.
12 
Therefore, if excessive performance difficulty is accepted as a type of impossibility, 
this will result in excessive protection of the debtor against the creditor.
13 
 
In its various decisions, the Turkish Court of Cassation has also explicitly stated that 
an excessive performance difficulty is not technically an impossibility that cancels the 
                                                 
8 For some examples of these cases see, Yarg. HGK, 19.2.1997 T., E. 1996/11-674 K.1997/87; Yarg. 
HGK,  18.11.1988  T.,  E.  1998/13-815  K.1998/835;  Yarg.  HGK,  15.10.2003  T.,  E.  2003/13-599 
K.2003/599;  Yarg.  HGK,  19.2.1997  T.,  E.  1996/11-762  K.1997/77;  Yarg.  HGK,  17.9.1997  T.,  E. 
1997/11-460 K.1997/651. 




9 Erzurumluoğlu, Op. Cit. p. 60. 
10 Gürsoy, Op. Cit. p. 26. 
11 Tunçomağ, Op. Cit. p. 887. According to Gürsoy, the important distinction is that if the debtor is 
incapable  of  performing,  then  this  is  a  case  of  impossibility.  However,  if  he/she  is  capable  of 
performance  but  this  performance  cannot  be  expected  of  him/her,  then  this  is  a  case  where  the 
principle of Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus applies. Accordingly, the former is a natural and logical 
situation, where as the latter is a moral one. Gürsoy, Op. Cit. p. 27. 
12  . Akyol, Dürüstlük Kuralı ve Hakkın Kötüye Kullanılması Yasağı, 2
nd Edition, Đstanbul 2006, p. 86. 
13 Erzurumluoğlu, Op. Cit. p. 61; Gürsoy Op. Cit. p. 27. 
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parties’ obligations. For instance, in one of its decisions, the court rejected the claims 
of a seller who argued that after the economic crisis and devaluation in the country, 
the extreme increase in the price of the goods subject to the contract has made it 
impossible for him to perform. The court emphasized that in case of impossibility the 
obligation  automatically  ends  and  no  possibility  to  adapt  the  contract  to  the  new 
conditions  exists.  Therefore,  the  case  where  performance  becomes  excessively 
difficult lies outside the scope of the technical term of impossibility.
14 
 
C. Economic Impossibility in the Turkish Draft Code of Obligations compared 
with the Draft Common Frame of Reference of the European Union 
 
In the current Turkish law, cases of economic impossibility are dealt with under the 
general doctrine of the collapse of the basis of transaction. However, in the reform 
draft  of  the  Turkish  Code  of  Obligations,  prepared  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and 
submitted  to  the  Turkish  Grand  National  Assembly  on  December  24,  2007,  the 
concept of excessive performance difficulty entered explicitly into Turkish law. Here is 
the text of the reform draft: 
 
“III. Excessive Performance Difficulty 
Article 137- If a condition, that at the time of the conclusion of the contract could not be foreseen by 
the parties and it cannot  also be expected that the parties should have foreseen  it, arises with  a 
reason not originating from the debtor, and changes the facts present at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, against the debtor in such a way that, demanding performance from him results against 
the  principles  of  good  faith,  and  if  the  debtor  has  not  performed  yet  or  he/she  has  performed  by 
reserving his/her rights arising from the excessive difficulty of performance, the debtor has the right to 
demand from the judge adaptation of the contract to the new conditions, or if this is not possible, 
he/she has the right to avoid the contract. In long-term contracts, in principle, the debtor uses a right of 
termination rather than avoidance.” 
 
The issue of economic impossibility is also dealt under the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference of the European Union (DCFR)
15. However there are some considerable 
                                                 
14 See Yarg. 13. HD, 16.4.1996 T., E.1996/3653 K.1996/3920. Similarly in another decision, the Court 
decided  that  non-delivery  of  some  drugs  because  of  a  foreign-exchange  bottleneck  cannot  be 
accepted as a technical impossibility which cancels the parties’ obligations. For this decision see Yarg. 
13. HD, 14.5.1981 T., E.1981/2749 K.1981/3786. 
15 “III. – 1:110: Variation or termination by court on a change of circumstances 
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differences between the two provisions on the same issue. First, DCFR differs from 
the  Turkish  solution  insofar  as  it  includes  two  symmetric  cases  of  an  excessive 
performance difficulty and an excessive reduction of the value of the contract for the 
other party.
16 So, whereas in Turkish law these two cases are dealt within completely 
different areas of contract law leading to different tests, here we have one unified 
solution for both symmetric cases. The second difference is that according to the 
DCFR, the power of the court is very comprehensive insofar as the court can adjust 
the contract to the new circumstances or terminate the contract with no damages 
paid or with expectation damages or with reliance damages. Other solutions are also 
possible.  Therefore  one  could  argue  that  the  DCFR  gives  more  discretion  to  the 
courts than the Turkish solution which can lead only to a termination of the contract 
without any damage compensation or to an adjustment. 
 
We will deal with the rationale and the consequences of the new rule of the Turkish 
Draft Code of Obligations from an economic perspective. This means that we will ask 
whether the proposed rules lead to an increase or a decrease of the economic wealth 
generated by contracts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
(1)  An  obligation  must  be  performed  even  if  performance  has  become  more  onerous,  whether 
because the cost of performance has increased or because the value of what is to be received in 
return has diminished. 
(2) If, however, performance of a contractual obligation or of an obligation arising from a unilateral 
juridical act becomes so onerous because of anexceptional change of circumstances that it would be 
manifestly unjust to hold the debtor to the obligation a court may: 
(a) vary the obligation in order to make it reasonable and equitable in the new circumstances; or 
(b) terminate the obligation at a date and on terms to be determined by the court. 
(3) Paragraph (2) applies only if: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time when the obligation was incurred; 
(b) the debtor did not at that time take into account, and could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken into account, the possibility or scale of that change of circumstances; 
(c) the debtor did not assume, and cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed, the risk of that 
change of circumstances; and 
(d) the debtor has attempted, reasonably and in good faith, to achieve by negotiation a reasonable 
and equitable adjustment of the terms regulating the obligation.” 
16  Consider the following case: In 1960 a textile firm in the GDR (Former East Germany) bought 
machines of a type which were produced in 1930s from an exporter who ordered the machines from a 
still existing producer. The producer started producing them from the old blue prints. Before delivery a 
political crisis between west and east Germany made this business impossible and the buyer lost any 
interest in the contract (in economic terms his willingness to pay collapsed to zero after the contract 
formation). These particular machines were also not marketable outside the GDR. Under the DCFR it 
would be possible to entitle the buyer with a right not to accept the delivery and not to pay the price, 
but compensate the producer for the costs already incurred. Under the Turkish Draft Law this case 
would have to be decided on the basis of legal dogmas outside the scope of excessive performance 
difficulty.   
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II. Prevailing Legal Doctrines: A Literature Review  
 
The  doctrine  of  impossibility  deals  with  the  question  of  which  of  the  parties  of  a 
contract will bear the results of the impossibility of performance, within which limits. 
The prevailing doctrine answers this question in mainly two different ways.
17  
 
The first group of writers, approaches the question from the economics’ theory of 
efficient risk bearing and imposes the entire results of impossibility on either of the 
parties.    Accordingly  Posner  and  Rosenfield  argue  that  discharge  claim  can  be 
brought  in  cases  where  the  contract  has  not  specifically  allocated  the  risk  of 
impossibility to either of the parties and the event, giving rise to the discharge claim 
was not avoidable by the promisor’s any cost-justified precaution. According to the 
authors, if these two conditions have been satisfied, the loss should be placed on the 
party who is the superior (the lowest-cost) risk bearer party.
18 Similarly, Cooter and 
Ulen emphasize that efficiency requires allocating the risk to the party who can bear it 
at least cost. Therefore, an efficient impossibility doctrine should assign the liability, 
to the party, who can bear the risk that performance becomes impossible, at least 
cost.
19 Likewise, underlining that more attention should be paid mainly on the issue of 




Unlike the first group of writers who concentrate on figuring out the party that should 
bear  the  risk  of  impossibility,  a  second  group  of  writers  consider  the  issue  of 
impossibility  from  the  perspective  of  designing  efficient  remedies  for  breach  of 
contract.  They  focus  on  dividing  the  risk  of  impossibility  between  the  contracting 
parties, which results in a wide range of possibilities from expectation damages to no 
remedy. Accordingly, Shavell argues that when the parties to the contract are both 
                                                 
17  Trimarchi,  Op.Cit.  p.63.  For  an  analysis  of  the  doctrine  of  impracticability  from  a  behavioural 
economics perspective also see Smythe, Op. Cit. p.227.   
18 The superior risk bearer can be figured by three factors: knowledge of the magnitude of the loss, 
knowledge of the probability that it will occur, and costs of self-insurance or market insurance.
 See 
R.A. Posner and A.M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic 
Analysis, 6 Journal of Legal Studies, 83, 117 (1977). 
19 R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, 5th Edition, Reading 2007, p.241. 
20 See C. J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 Journal of Legal Studies, 
311, 322 (1982). 
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risk-neutral, expectation damage induces efficient breach of the contract and Pareto 
efficiency.  However,  if  the  parties’  willingness  and  ability  to  bear  risk  differs,  the 
allocation  of  risk  enters  into  an  evaluation  of  damage  measures,  and  reliance 
measure might be preferred.
21 Accordingly,  arguing that the “superior risk bearer” 
criterion is inappropriate and insurance is not an adequate option in such cases of 
absolute  uncertainty,  Trimarchi  accepts  that  in  a  case  of  economic  impossibility, 
efficiency  might  require  the  contract  to  be  discharged  or  price  to  be  adjusted.
22 
However, White argues that except for some very rare occasions, contracts should 
not  be  discharged,  as  a  zero  damage  level  leads  to  inefficiently  high  breach 
incentives on the performing party.
23 On the other hand, Trakman asserts that when 
a  party  claims  that  specific  performance  has  become  impracticable,  rather  than 
granting or denying an absolute excuse from non-performance, the court should first 
of all focus on dividing the losses between the parties by considering each party’s 
capacity to control the risk of loss arising from the non-performance.
24    
 
In  order  to  show  our  stance,  in  the  next  sections,  we  will  refer  to  the  wealth 
generating function of contracts and discuss the choices of specific performance or 
damage  compensation.  We  will  also  maintain  under  which  circumstances,  price 
adjustment or discharge of the obligation to perform is more appropriate.   
 
                                                 
21 S. Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 The Bell Journal of Economics, 466, 487-
488 (1980). Polinsky argues that the expectation and specific performance remedies can optimally 
allocate the contract risk only if one of the parties is risk neutral. A. M. Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through 
Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 Journal of Legal Studies, 427, 528 (1983). According to Eisenberg, if 
the parties shared a tacit incorrect assumption that the non-occurrence of some circumstance was 
certain, the promisor should only be liable for reliance damages. However, in cases where increase in 
prices and costs result in a loss to a promisor that is significantly greater than the risk the parties 
reasonably would have expected the promisor to have taken, the promisor should be liable for  a 
modified form of expectation damages, but not full expectation damages. Eisenberg, Op. Cit. p.207. 
22 Trimarchi, Op. Cit. p.81-82. According to Speidel, court-imposed price adjustments can be made in 
a some occasions, since the parties should share through compromise the unbargained for gains and 
losses. Additionally, the advantaged party has the duty to cooperate and bargain in good faith ex-post. 
Moreover, the adjustment of the court redresses the advantaged party’s opportunistic conduct. R. E. 
Speidel,  Court-Imposed  Price  Adjustments  Under  Long-term  Supply  Contracts,  76  Northwestern 
University Law Review, 369, 421 (1981-1982). 
23 M. J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due To Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 
Journal of Legal Studies, 353, 375 (1988). Skyes claims that although it is not always inefficient to 
discharge  contractual  obligations,  the  efficiency  of  discharge  is  exceptionally  difficult  to  ascertain. 
According to the author, the information required to prove the necessity of discharge will rarely be 
available to the courts. Skyes, Op. Cit. p. 93 (1990). 
24 L. E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 Minnesota 
Law  Review,  471,  519  (1984-1985).  Also  see  J.M.  Perloff,  The  Effects  of  Breaches  of  Forward 
Contracts Due to Unanticipated Price Changes, 10 Journal of Legal Studies, 221 (1981). 
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III. Contracts as Wealth Generating Mechanisms 
 
A. The Allocation of Risks in a Fully Specified Contract 
 
We  concentrate  on  contracts  that  are  to  the  mutual  benefit  of  the  parties.
25  For 
simplicity’s  sake,  we  refer  to  a  “seller”,  who  owes  specific  performance,  and  a 
“buyer”.  
 
Contracts shift scarce economic resources into the hands of those who value them 
most.  But,  contracts also  involve  risks.  Complex  contracts  with complex  risks  are 
typical of an advanced market economy and they involve in particular the risk of a 
change of circumstances between contract formation and performance.
26  
 
In a legal environment in which the law has not allocated some risk, for instance, a 
rise in raw material prices, the parties must then allocate the risk themselves in the 
pre-contractual negotiations. They shift the risk to the cheapest cost avoider, i.e. to 
the party, which can mitigate damage from risk, insure, or self-insure the risk at the 
lowest cost.
27 This outcome is desirable from the point of view of society, as all of us 
are interested in legal arrangements, which reduce the total costs of production and 
consequently reduce prices for goods and services. Nevertheless, this arrangement 
is also in the interest of the parties themselves, because it increases the total surplus 
from the contract. Subsequently, the total gain from shifting risks to the cheapest cost 
avoider can be distributed among the parties.   
 
 
                                                 
25 On contracts’ wealth creating function see H. B. Schäfer and C. Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil 
Law, Unpublished Edited Version, p. 352. 
26 See R.E. Speidel, Contracts in Crises: Excuse Doctrine and Retrospective Government Acts, 1
st 
Edition,  Durham  2007;  J.  D.  Wladis,  Impracticability  as  Risk  Allocation:  The  Effect  of  Changed 
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Georgia Law Review, 503 (1988); 
R.  E.  Barnett,  Perspectives  on  Contract  Law,  3
rd  Edition,  New  York  2005,  p.  407;  C.P.  Gillette, 
Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 Journal of Legal 
Studies,  535  (1990);  G.G.  Triantis,  Contractual  Allocations  of  Unknown  Risks:  A  Critique  of  the 
Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 University of Toronto Law Journal, 450 (1992). 
27 See R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1 (1960); See G. 
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1
st Edition, p. 77 (1970). See 
Posner and Rosenfield, Op. Cit. p. 90. On the importance of mitigation of losses also see Bruce, Op. 
Cit. 311. 
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B. The Rationale of Default Rules in Contract Law 
 
As Ronald Coase has shown in a celebrated article,
28 parties will always find the 
efficient risk allocation in a contract if transactions costs are negligible. Yet, in most 
cases transactions costs are not zero. They might be so high that many risks remain 
unallocated by the parties. In those situations, the legal order helps the contracting 
parties  by  providing  a  set  of  default  rules  in  the  contract  code.
29  It  is  however 
important to note that the distribution of risks not only affects the total surplus from 
the contract. It affects also the price of the good or service. The more the law shifts 
risks to the buyer, the lower will be the price of the good or service, and vice versa.     
 
IV.  The  Life  of  the  Contract  if  Performance  Costs  Increase  After  Contract 
Formation  
 
A. The Costs of Performance Increase but the Contract Still Generates a Net 
Surplus 
 
After contract formation but before delivery, the cost of performance may rise in such 
a  way  that  although  the  contract  leads  to a  loss to the  seller,  it  still  generates  a 
surplus. At such circumstances, there is no reason from an economic point of view to 
terminate  the  contract.  Because,  the  contract  still  increases  the  total  wealth  of 
society. Its economic rationale to generate surplus is still intact. As a result the seller 
will incur additional costs arising from this increase. This is not unfair because the 
reservation price of the seller includes the expected costs to mitigate, insure or bear 
any cost increases after contract formation, given the efficient allocation of risk to the 
cheapest cost avoider. Moreover, it is economically efficient, because the contract 
still generates a net surplus.  
 
To achieve this end, contract law provides the buyer with a remedy in case of breach. 
He  can  insist  on  specific  performance.  If  the  seller  disregards  a  court  order  to 
                                                 
28 Coase, Op.Cit. p.15. 
29 H.B. Schäfer, Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, 14 
Supreme Court Review, 113 (2006). 
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perform, this would be a contempt of court, a behavior that can ripen into a criminal 
offense. If law enforcement is swift, the seller will perform because this makes him 
better off than not performing. This is the desired outcome from a legal policy point of 
view.  Alternatively,  the  buyer  can  claim  damage  compensation  in  case  of  non-
performance and get a damage payment. In that case, he does not pay the price and 
the seller has a total net loss of higher that he would incur in case of performance. 
Again, the seller is better off by performing than by not performing. In other words, 
the rule of specific performance and the rule of expectation damages both guarantee 
that specific performance makes the seller better off than a breach, as long as the 




B.  The  Costs  of  Performance  Increase  and  Specific  Performance  Would 
Generate a Negative Surplus 
  
After contract formation, if the cost of performance increases in such a way that the 
loss of seller is higher than the profit of the buyer upon specific performance, this 
shows that the increase in the cost of performance destroys the total surplus from the 
contract  and  makes  it  negative,  as  the  contract  produces  a  net  loss  or  negative 
surplus. In other words, specific performance would destroy the economic rationale of 
the contract to produce a surplus.  
 
Contract law should provide remedies that make parties better off when they do not 
deliver  specific  performance.    Otherwise,  the  economy  would  waste  resources. 
However,  to  achieve  this  result  a  doctrine  of  economic  impossibility  is  neither 
necessary nor desirable. As we will show, the result of contract termination in this 
constellation is obtained with the rule of specific performance as well as with the rule 
of expectation damages. In Anglo-Saxon countries, specific performance is usually 
not an option, but damage compensation is.  
 
If the party that breaks the contract pays expectation damages, this is not only a fair 
result for the party suffering from the breach.
31 It is also a mechanism, which ensures 
                                                 
30 See Trimarchi, Op. Cit. p. 74. 
31 See Trimarchi, Op. Cit. p. 76. 
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breach of contract if and only if this is efficient from the economic perspective. Under 
a rule of expectation damages, the seller is obliged to pay a compensation without 
receiving the income. Therefore, if the costs increase in such a way that the cost of 
performance  is  less  than  the  loss  of  income  (which  includes  the  damage 
compensation), the seller will not breach the contract and prefer to perform. This is 
efficient because the contract still generates a net surplus. If the cost increase was 
greater,  and  the  loss  of  income  including  damage  compensation  (consisting  of 
damages  and  the  loss  of  the  contractual  price)  will  be  less  than  the  cost  of 
performance consequently, the seller will decide to break the contract. This is again 
an efficient result from an economic perspective. That way, we cannot have a party 
producing something at a cost for which even the highest valued buyer is willing to 
pay less than that its cost.  
 
Thus, the rule of expectation damages provides a mechanism, which gives incentives 
for  the  party  that  owes  specific  performance  to  breach  a  contract  if  and  only  if 
circumstances arise between the formation of the contract and performance, which 
make the total surplus from the contract negative.     
 
In legal practice, this rule has some severe shortcomings. The buyer receives his lost 
profits.  If,  however,  the  buyer  also  loses  reputation  vis-à-vis  his  customers,  it  is 
questionable whether these losses can be compensated. The plaintiff has to specify 
his damages and many damages are too vague to prove even though they exist. 
Even  to  merely  prove  a  loss  of  profit  is  often  very  time  consuming  and  costly. 
Remember  the  case  of  the  restaurant  owner  and  his  idea  to  open  a  “nostalgia 
restaurant”. How can he convince the court that this was a very profitable idea and 
that the furniture was essential to realizing that profit? This is unlikely and he will 
probably be awarded only a small amount of damage compensation. 
 
Furthermore, hardly all of the buyer surplus is recoverable. In many countries, for 
instance in Germany, the sentimental value that the buyer attaches to the good or 
service is not recoverable in court because it is so hard, if not impossible, to evaluate 
in money terms. For example, assume that somebody contracts to buy a valuable 
18
th century carpet at a certain price. The loss of sentimental value in case of breach 
can  be  a  large  fraction  or  even  multiple  of  the  purchase  price  and  is  almost 
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impossible  to  assess.  Therefore,  the  rule  of  damage  compensation  for  breach  of 
contract is a perfect mechanism to strike down inefficient contracts if the courts are 
able  to  asses  accurately  the  damage  and  has  no  tendency  to  over-  or  under 
compensates  the  losses.  In  legal  practice,  this  rule  will  often  lead  to  under 
compensation. As the breaching party knows this and will consider it when deciding 
whether  to  breach,  some  contracts  will  be  breached  even  while  the  joint  surplus 
remains positive. This is an inefficient and socially undesirable outcome.  
 
The second rule is specific performance, according to which the buyer can force the 
seller  to  perform.  If  the  seller  fails  to  perform  in  defiance  of  the  court  order,  this 
amounts to an obstruction of court, which can ripen into a criminal offence. Assume 
now for argument’s sake that the buyer can actually force the seller to perform even if 
the costs increase substantially and destroy the total surplus from the contract. In this 
situation, so the argument goes, the parties would still terminate the contract, which 
is desirable from a social point of view.  
 
The seller would then strike a new deal with the buyer, offering to compensate his 
losses plus some additional amount of money to get out of the contract. The buyer is 
then  even  better  off  than  he  would  have  been  if  the  original  contract  had  been 
performed. Therefore, the rule of specific performance will also lead to performance 
of the contract as long as the contract still produces a total surplus. It will produce a 
new contract to terminate the old contract at a price whenever specific performance 
would result in a negative surplus.  
 
It is easy to see that under the expectation damages rule, the seller is in a stronger 
position than under the specific performance rule. Under specific performance, there 
are higher transfer payments from the party, which owes specific performance to the 
other party. In comparison to the rule of expectation damages, specific performance 
has the undeniable advantage that a contract is only terminated if the buyer agrees. 
He will do so only if all his losses (and more) are compensated, even those losses 
that he would not be able to prove under a rule of damage compensation or that are 
not legally recoverable. This precludes under compensation of the buyer when the 
contract is terminated.  
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This is the upside of the specific performance rule. The downside is that the law puts 
the buyer in a holdup position, in which he can extract much of the gain from the 
breach. To illustrate: In Germany, a car manufacturer sold a car with a particular 
catalytic converter. After contract formation but before delivery, the regulatory norms 
changed  in  accordance  with  EU  regulation  to  a  somewhat  lower  standard.  The 
manufacturer delivered the car with a converter that met the new EU standard. The 
customer insisted on the converter that was stipulated in the contract. The company 
argued – in vain - that the contractual converter existed only as a blue print and to 
manufacture only a single piece would cost much more than to manufacture another 
car. Here the rule of specific performance guarantees that the buyer gets exactly 
what he wants if he values the promised converter very highly. This is a desired 
result. Otherwise, he can extract large sums of money from the car manufacturer to 
be released from the contract and let off the hook. This hold up position does not only 
redistribute wealth to some extent, which many would regard as unfair. It might also 
increase the costs of renegotiations, raise production costs and lead to an inefficient 
cross subsidization from other customers to those who use their strong contractual 
position to extract rents.   
 
Our conclusion is that in principle both remedies for breach of contract, expectation 
damages and specific performance, provide a mechanism to end the contract when 
performance becomes so costly that it would lead to a negative total surplus from the 
contract, and to honor the contract as long as it generates a positive total surplus. 
However, in practice damage compensation often leads to under compensation with 
the result that sellers also break some efficient contracts. In other words, the position 
of  the  buyer  might  be  too  weak.  By  contrast,  the  rule  of  specific  performance 
guarantees  that  all  efficient  contracts  are  honored,  but  that  due  to  the  hold  up 
position and high transactions costs some inefficient contracts are also honored. In 
other words, the position of the buyer might be too strong. The two rules provide 
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V. Approaching Economic Impossibility 
 
A. The Case of Contract Termination 
 
The question now arises as to why we need a rule of economic impossibility if we 
have a mechanism, which reliably puts all inefficient contracts in one box and all 
efficient  contracts  into  another,  in  the  sense  that  inefficient  contracts  will  not  be 
performed, and efficient contracts will be performed. The rationale for the necessity of 
this rule is the following: 
 
Assume a case in which the costs of performance become excessively high and it 
becomes  obvious  for  everybody  that  in  this  situation,  specific  performance  would 
destroy  all  the  gains  from  the  contract  and  leave  the  performing  party  with  an 
additional large loss.  
 
In this case, it becomes obvious not just for the parties but for any third party that 
specific performance would not only destroy the total surplus from the contract but 
would make it highly negative. Therefore, in this case it is not necessary to rely on 
costly  mechanisms  to  induce  the  parties  to  decide  whether  a  contract  should  be 
breached or performed. This is obvious for every outsider including a judge. In this 
case, a rule of economic impossibility would reduce transaction costs. This rule would 
entitle  the  seller  to  deny  performance  but  would  not  entitle  the  buyer  to  damage 
compensation.  An  economically  sound  evaluation  of  the  doctrine  of  economic 
impossibility would require answering three different questions.  
 
First, was the increased cost of performance a low probability event? If it was not, 
such as an increase in the prices of raw  materials, a change of interest rates, a 
change of the inflation rate, or a change of the exchange rate, the seller can take this 
into consideration when he forms his price. For instance, he may engage in forward 
contracting or demand a price that reflects the risk. The economic rationale to include 
a test of low probability or foreseeability is that high risk can be taken care of in the 
contract  itself.  Assume  that  at  the  time  of  contract  formation  the  buyer  has  a 
willingness to pay of 120 and the seller knows that dependent on circumstances his 
costs for the specific performance will be either 100 or 1000 with an equal probability. 
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Then  his  expected  costs  of  the  specific  performance  will  be  550  and  he  will 
consequently not agree to the contract as long as the price is below 550. In that case 
there will be no contract.  The alternative would be a clause stipulated in the contract, 
which  allows  the  seller  to  deny  the  specific  performance  incase  the  high  cost 
alternative realizes. In that case, the price for the service or good will be higher than 
100 and lower than 120. It can therefore be left for the parties either to allocate the 
risk of excessive performance difficulty to the buyer, or alternatively to abstain from 
the  contract.  A  rule  of  economic  impossibility  imposed  by  the  legal  order  makes 
therefore sense in those cases in which transactions cost are high and consequently 
the parties do not care about low probability risks.  
 
Second,  was  the  increase  of  the  costs  of  specific  performance  so  high  that 
performance would obviously cause a negative surplus? We have already pointed 
out that even without any rule of economic impossibility or base of the contract, the 
contract will be terminated in this case under a rule of expectation damages, as well 
as under a rule of specific performance. Expectation damages guarantee ideally that 
a contract will be breached if and only if the total surplus from the contract becomes 
negative. And under the rule of specific performance, parties have an incentive to 
end the contract by a new agreement when this is economically efficient. Both rules 
however have their disadvantages in practice and are costly in terms of transactions 
cost. Therefore, a rule of economic impossibility which allows denial of the specific 
performance is reasonable only in those cases in which it is clear for an outside 
observer that the value of a contract becomes negative. This saves transactions cost, 
for instance of costly damage assessment.  
 
Third:  For  this  case  group,  it  is  therefore  important  not  only  to  include  the  cost 
increase but also the interests of the buyer in the concept of economic impossibility. If 
the costs of performance increase so much that it is certain that the benefits from the 
contract  would  be  destroyed  by  performance,  the  contract  should  be  terminated 
under this doctrine. We regard it as a weakness of the Turkish Draft Law that it does 
not  explicitly  take  the  buyer`s  interest  into consideration and  concentrates  on the 
specific performance difficulty as such. This is different from the DCFR but also from 
the solutions in other countries, for instance in Germany.    
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In Germany the legal doctrine of economic impossibility takes buyer surplus explicitly 
into account. This doctrine, which was originally judge made, became part of the civil 
code  as  part  of  a  reform  in  2002  (Schuldrechtsreform).  In  Subsection  275,  2, 
economic  impossibility  is  contingent  on  an  excessive  increase  in  the  costs  of 
performance  but  also  on  the  interest  of  the  party,  which  is  entitled  to  specific 
performance. This solution to the problem is in line with economic reasoning.  
 
To  illustrate  the  intuition  behind  the  economic  argument,  consider  the  following 
example. A hospital buys from an importer medicine which is not easily available on 
the  local  market.  For  simplicity’s  sake,  assume  that  there  are  only  two  types  of 
medicine: one medicine which relieves a rare but relatively harmless type of acne, 
and insulin, which is a life saving medicine for a particular type of patients. Assume 
that  the  importer  is  contractually  obliged  to  make  a  weekly  delivery  of  medicine, 
which he imports from a foreign company, to the hospital at a fixed price. Assume 
now that a particular delivery becomes difficult because the production site of the 
company from which the importer receives the delivery burns down. To honor the 
contract and make a timely delivery, it would be necessary for the importer to rent a 
helicopter to get the acne medicine and insulin from two different foreign companies. 
This  would  imply  an  excessive  increase  in  performance  costs.  A  doctrine  that 
incorporates the idea of a buyer surplus would arrive at the conclusion that for the 
acne medicine contract this might be a case of economic impossibility leading to the 
termination of this week’s specific performance. No patient suffers a serious harm if 
this disease is not treated for a week. But for insulin, it would be necessary for the 
importer to rent a helicopter for perhaps several thousand Turkish lira per hour to 
provide the life saving medicine in time if no cheaper method exists. A seller of insulin 
must  know  at  the time  of  contract formation  how  important  the  timely  delivery  is. 
Unlike a seller of a less important medicine, he must form a price that reflects even 
excessive  risks.  Eventhough  the  costs  of  delivering  both  medicines  have  risen 
equally high, our considerations would lead to economic impossibility and the right to 
deny the specific performance in the case of the acne medicine. Here the consumer 
surplus is relatively low and it is easy to see that performance would end up in a 
negative total surplus from the contract. However in the second case, the buyer`s 
interest is extremely high and even though the performance costs become excessive 
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it is equally clear that due to their life saving characteristics there remains a surplus 
for the buyer.  
 
Should in this case price be adjusted to the changed circumstances? In our view, this 
is also not a case of price adjustment. The risk that a life saving medicine cannot be 
delivered through the usual chains is not extra-ordinary and prudent parties would 
take this into account, This is therefore not a case of price adjustment, even though 
the  costs  of  performance  have  excessively  increased.    The  hospital  would  have 
insisted that the insulin be delivered each week at whatever cost and it would have 
been willing to pay the price, which fully reflects this risk for the importer. However, 
again in a fully specified contract, the same clause would not have entered into the 
contract  for  the  acne  medicine,  which  is  rare  but  does  not  have  the  same  utility 
(consumer surplus).  
 
Therefore, from an economic perspective, it is important to include in the concept of 
economic  impossibility  not  only  the  unexpected  and  excessive  changes  of 
performance cost but also the interest of the other party in the contract (the buyer 
surplus). It is not the excessive and low probability increase of performance costs per 
se  that  triggers  the  right  to  deny  specific  performance  but  rather  the  increase  in 
relation to the interest of the buyer (consumer surplus).  
 
We recommend therefore that the Turkish reform proposal should take the interest of 
the other party in the contract explicitly into consideration. This would be possible by 
adding a sentence to Article 137 of the Turkish draft proposal. “In making a decision 
on terminating the contract, the judge takes into consideration the party’s interest in 
specific performance.” One could argue that this is not necessary as the draft code 
makes reference to the good faith principle.
32 The judges could make use of good 
faith in differentiating between the two sub-categories of a high and a low buyer’s 
surplus.  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether  every  judge  understands  the  crucial 
importance  of  the  interest  for  the  decision  to  terminate  the  contract.  The  present 
                                                 
32 The wording of the Article is as follows: “If a condition… arises…and changes the facts present at 
the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  contract,  against  the  debtor  in  such  a  way  that,  demanding 
performance from him results against the principles of good faith…” 
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wording  of  the  draft  code,  which  concentrates  exclusively  on  increased  costs  of 
performance, does not give him any indication. 
 
B. The Case of Preserving the Contract and Increasing the Price 
 
There  is  a  second  group  of  cases,  in  which  the  judge  should  not  terminate  the 
contract but increase the price of the good or service. For instance, if due to an 
unexpected  and  excessive  difficulty  of  performance,  the  cost  of  performance 
increases considerably, but this cost is still less than the buyer’s surplus (which was 
ex-ante significantly higher than the price), the contract should not be terminated as it 
still produces a net total surplus. But at this case, although there is a positive surplus 
from the contract, the contractual price is very low when compared to the actual costs 
of performance and the buyer’s surplus. Therefore, the judge should increase the 
price of the good or service. 
  
If the parties stipulated a fixed price, the contractual risks are usually allocated to the 
cheapest cost avoider either by the parties themselves or by law.
33 Especially the risk 
of a cost increase after contract formation is shifted to the party that owes specific 
performance  and  the  price  of  the  good  or  service  reflects  the  risk  allocation.  
Therefore, this constellation should lead judges to order neither a termination of the 
contract  nor  a  change  of  the  stipulated  price.  Economic  considerations  suggest 
however two exceptions to this rule.  
 
First: The risk, which led to an excessive rise of performance costs, was so remote 
that even the best-informed observer would not consider it. This condition is stricter 
than “unforeseeability”. It is so improbable that not even Sherlock Holms would be 
able to consider this risk and would not think of adjusting the price stipulated in the 
contract accordingly. In such a case, when it is obvious that the price does not reflect 
the risk and if the contract still generates a surplus, the court should increase the 
price of performance. This is a rare case. In our introductory remarks we referred to a 
freight  contract  for  freight  to  be  shipped  from  Istanbul  to  Mumbai.  The  costs  of 
shipping became excessively high because of the war between Israel and Egypt in 
                                                 
33 See above section C/2. 
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1973, which led to a closing of the Suez Canal. In consequence, the ships had to 
take their route around Africa.
34 This contingency is so remote that even very diligent 
parties do not include it in the contract and it is therefore not reflected in the price. 
The  contract  can  however  still  produce  a  surplus  and  therefore  should  not  be 
terminated. In that case the judge should adjust the price to the increased cost of 
performance. We think however that in such cases the party who receives specific 
performance  should  have  a  right  to  opt  out  of  the  contract.  To  see  why  this  is 
necessary, we divide the shipping case into two different sub-categories.  
 
First, assume that the freight is coal and that the increased freight costs would make 
shipping unprofitable as well as economically inefficient. Under these circumstances, 
it  would  be  better  for  Indian  importers  to  buy  their  coal  from  other  sources.  If 
therefore  the  adjustment  in  price  would  make  the  contract  unprofitable  for  the 
exporter of coal, he should be entitled to opt out of the contract. Second, if the freight 
is cameras, and therefore the value of one ton of cargo is very high, the contract may 
remain  profitable  from  the  buyer’s  perspective  despite  the  excessive  increase  in 
transportation costs. In that case, the price adjustment as well as the validity of the 
contract is the economically and legally appropriate solution. 
 
The draft law of the Code of Obligations has not explicitly allowed for this possibility. 
We suggest therefore that the draft code should explicitly include this possibility and 
tentatively propose the following wording: “After the judge has set a new price for the 
specific performance, the other party is entitled to terminate the contract.” 
 
Second: The risk was foreseeable, but it is clear for an outside observer (the judge) 
that both parties have not considered it in the price formation. The consequence may 
be a gross imbalance of the gains from the contract. This sometimes happens in long 
term contracts, in which parties might foresee the effects of creeping inflation but are 
unable  to  appreciate  the  powerful  exponential  long  run  effects  of  small  annual 
changes. This effect is particularly strong in long term contracts spanning 40 or 50 
                                                 
34 See Posner and Rosenfield, Op. Cit. p. 103; See Trimarchi, Op. Cit. p. 81; J. H. Schlegel, Of Nuts, 
and  Ships,  and  Sealing  Wax,  Suez,  and  Frustrating  Things-  The  Doctrine  of  Impossibility  of 
Performance, 23 Rutgers Law Review, 419 (1986-1969); R.L. Birmingham, A Second Look at the 
Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic 
Theory, 20 Hastings Law Review, 1393 (1968-1969). 
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years, which often fail to take inflation risk properly into consideration. Even though 
creeping  inflation  is  a  widespread  and  well-known  phenomenon  in  all  Western 
countries and is therefore foreseeable, the terms of the contract often reveal beyond 
doubt that parties did not consider the inflation risk. In 1930s Germany, many land 
lease contracts stretched across a period of 50 years. When the rental contract was 
formed, the price reflected the market value of the land and it included some markup 
for  inflation.  However,  30  years  on,  the  rental  payments  were  often  less  than  10 
percent  of  the  market  price.  This  made  it  obvious  that  inflation  risk  was  not 
considered even though it was foreseeable. This is again a case, in which judges 
should adjust the price. Even though the risk was foreseeable, it is clear that the 
contractual price does not reflect the risk.  
 
Article 137 of the Turkish Reform draft fully covers these two cases and it is therefore 
fully in line with economic considerations. 
  
C. The Party, which Owes the Specific Performance, Negligently Caused the 
Excessive Performance Difficulty 
 
It is obvious from an economic perspective that the legal consequences, which we 
discussed so far do not apply if the “seller” has negligently caused the economic 
impossibility.
35 If the consequence of his negligent behavior is to make performance 
of  the  contract  meaningless,  the  seller  should  be  entitled  to  denying  specific 
performance but the buyer should be entitled to damage compensation, otherwise 
the seller’s incentives to perform will be insufficient. If, however, the contract is still of 
great interest and still produces a surplus, the judge should not adjust the price to the 
new  cost  of  performance.  This  again  would  give  the  seller  an  incentive  to  invest 
enough resources into the contract. 
 
We propose to include the following rule into Article 137 of the reform draft. “If the 
party which owes specific performance has negligently caused the conditions which 
lead to termination of the contract, it must pay expectation damages. If the judge 
                                                 
35 Posner and Rosenfield also argue that the discharge of the contract should not be allowed when the 
event rendering performance uneconomical was reasonably preventable by either party. Posner and 
Rosenfield, Op. Cit. p. 98. 
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decides not to terminate the contract, he shall not adjust the price for the specific 
performance.”  
 
D. The Exceptional Character of a Rule of Economic Impossibility 
 
A rule of economic impossibility gives power that is more discretionary to judges. It 
explicitly  entitles  them  to  terminate  contracts  or  to  adjust  the  price  of  specific 
performance  even  though  parties  stipulated  a  fixed  price  in  the  contract.  It  is 
therefore important to repeat that this rule of economic impossibility or impracticability 
is neither designed nor used around the world to reallocate contractual risks after 
contract formation. Usually parties themselves or the rules of contract law as they are 
found  in  the  code  have  taken  these  decisions.  It  is  not  for  judges  to  re-write 
contracts
36. As a rule that covers specific cases, economic impossibility helps the 
business community and consumers to keep transactions costs low. It is certainly not 
intended  to  insure  businesspersons  against  risky  activities.  It  is  therefore  a  rule, 
which should be used with a high level of caution and restraint and only when it is 
obvious  for  everybody  that  in  this  situation,  specific  performance  would  not  only 
destroy the total surplus from the contract but would make it highly negative.  Hence 
this  condition  brings  an  almost  objective  limit  to  the  discretion  of  the  judge  and 
prevents  any  criticisms  that  due  to  the  lack  of  expertise  of  judges,  inappropriate 
decisions might be executed. 
 
Faust and Huber proposed recently to curb judicial discretion in Germany in cases of 
economic  impossibility.  They  suggest  that  the  party,  which  owes  the  specific 
performance should be entitled to deny performance (without damage payment), if 
the costs of the specific performance rise by an amount which exceeds the originally 
expected profit plus twice the interest of the other party in the performance.
37 It is 
clear what the advantages and disadvantages of such a precise rule are. It provides 
more legal certainty. But it also leads to less flexibility for judges. Sometimes a lack of 
flexibility can badly backfire and can force judges to take absurd decisions. In this 
article we remain silent as to the question whether for the Turkish Civil Code such a 
                                                 
36 V. Goldberg, Framing Contract Law,  Harvard Edition, p. 347. 
37 F. Faust and P.Huber „Schuldrechtsmodernisierung – Einführung in das neue Recht“ Verlag C.H. 
Beck, München 2002, p.50.  
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crystal clear rule with little discretion for judges or the relatively vague standard of the 
draft might be preferable. The Turkish draft is in line with the practice in Europe and 
the USA. Also, the reform process is much too advanced in Turkey as to discuss in 
detail the relative merits and shortcomings of a completely alternative approach to 
the problem.  
 
E. Dealing with Turkish Critique of Economic Impossibility 
 
We fully agree with the observation that “economic impossibility” is a contradiction in 
terms. In addition, the term becomes completely meaningless when it covers both 
sub-categories of the problem under consideration. Remember that in the first sub-
category,  the  judge  terminates  the  contract because  it  is  obvious  that due  to the 
excessive performance difficulties the contract cannot serve any reasonable purpose. 
The  second  sub-category,  however,  leads  to  an  adjustment  of  price  without 
necessarily  terminating  the  contract.  It  still  makes  sense  to  speak  of  economic 
impossibility as a façon de parler if one considers only the first sub-category in which 
the  judge  terminates  the  contract  because  in  this  case  the  legal  consequence  of 
economic  impossibility  is  the  same  as  under  impossibility.  We  call  this  economic 
impossibility in the narrow sense. The second category however, in which the terms 
of  the  contract  are  adjusted  but  the  contract  remains  valid,  implies  a  legal 
consequence  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  impossibility  doctrine.  In  some 
countries, like for instance Germany, legal dogma separates these two cases and the 
first  case  is  labeled  “economic  impossibility”,  (section  275,II  BGB)  whereas  the 
second case is labeled “basis of the contract” (section 313 BGB). These are two 
separate concepts. The reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations, however, 
contains either one rule, which might lead to a termination of the contract (economic 
impossibility) or another rule which might lead to an adjustment of price (basis of the 
contract). As the Turkish law reform draft unifies these two cases, we agree that the 
term that applies to both categories should not be “economic impossibility”.   
 
Let  us  come  back  to  our  three  illustrative  cases  of  the  Turkish  Supreme  Court 
(Yargıtay). We think it was the right decision that the Turkish Court rejected the claim 
from a retirement income contract. In our view, this risk is foreseeable in a country 
like Turkey in which large fluctuations of the inflation rate and of the exchange rate 
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have occurred several times in the past.  For the same reason, we think that the 





The Turkish Code of Obligations so far does not include an explicit norm for such 
contractual cases in which after the formation of the contract and before the specific 
performance,  the  costs  of  performance  rise  excessively.  These  cases  are  usually 
headed under doctrines such as commercial impracticability, economic impossibility 
or basis of the contract. Turkish law so far deals with these cases under the broad 
and unspecific cover of good faith and Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus. However, the 
new reform proposal includes explicitly the possibility that a judge either terminates 
the contract or adjusts the price of a contract above the stipulated price.  
 
We discuss this reform proposal for the Turkish Code of Obligations from a law and 
economics  perspective.  From  this  point  of  view,  a  contract  is  an  instrument  to 
increase  the  wealth  of  a  nation.  Fair  contracts  generate  producer  surplus  and 
consumer  surplus. They  shift  resources  into  the  hands  of  those,  who  value  them 
most.  A contract serves its economic purpose as long as it produces a surplus and is 
therefore  wealth  generating.  It  loses  its  very  rationale,  when  circumstances  arise 
which  make  this  surplus  negative.  We  therefore  argue  that  whenever  between 
contract  formation  and  performance  circumstances  destroy  the  surplus  from  a 
contract or turn it into a loss, the contract should be terminated.  
 
Usually,  the  rules  of  specific  performance  as  well  as  the  rule  of  damage 
compensation provide a mechanism to induce parties to honor a contract as long as 
the contract generates a surplus and to terminate the contract otherwise. However, 
there exist circumstances in which parties save transactions costs when the contract 
is  terminated  under  a  rule  of  impracticability  or  of  economic  impossibility  that  is, 
without damage payments or in which the judge adjusts the price for the specific 
performance.  The  introduction  of  such  a  rule  can  either  preserve  the  wealth 
generating character of a contract. Alternatively, it can terminate the contract, if it is 
                                                 
38 See above p. 1. 
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obvious not only for the parties themselves but also for third parties (judges) that 
specific performance would lead to a mere waste of economic resources. 
 
We  agree  with  most  of  the  rules  and  the  solutions  found  in  the  new  proposal. 
However, economic considerations lead us to propose some changes of the draft. 
First, we propose that a judge, when terminating a contract should take the interest of 
the party, which expects the specific performance, explicitly into account. Second, we 
propose that the damage claim should persist if the party, which owes the specific 
performance, has negligently caused the excessive performance difficulty. Third, we 
propose  that  in  case the  judge  adjusts  the  price  of  the  specific performance,  the 
party,  which  has  to  pay  this  increased  price,  should  be  entitled  to  terminate  the 
contract. We propose a combination of three tests to check whether a contract should 
be terminated or adjusted by the court.  
 
From a systematic and economic point of view, it would be advisable to regulate the 
case of an excessive performance difficulty and an excessive reduction of the interest 
of the other party in the contract with a same legal norm and with the same tests. The 
excessive reduction of the interest in the contract is fully symmetric to the excessive 
performance difficulty and should therefore be regulated by the same set of rules. 
Therefore we maintain that the DCFR is an improvement over what can be found in 
many legal orders including German Law or the Turkish Draft Proposal. Overall, we 
maintain that this reform proposal is an important step in improving Turkish contract 
law, especially for the business community 
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